As a crucial human resource support for China's modernization and the construction of a strong higher education system, university teachers shoulder multiple responsibilities including talent cultivation, scientific research innovation, and societal service. However, the lagging reform in compensation distribution systems and incentive mechanisms challenges the stability of the university teaching workforce.
According to a large-scale questionnaire survey conducted by our team across several universities nationwide, the satisfaction of young university teachers with their salaries is significantly lower than that of "star" talents. Over eighty percent of young teachers express dissatisfaction with the wage disparities among different positions within their institutions, with only one-fifth believing that their salaries reflect their individual contributions at work.
Simultaneously, compensation distribution in universities tilts towards a minority of high-level talents, further widening the wage gap within universities and diminishing the enthusiasm of the majority of ordinary middle-aged and young teachers, leading to what we term "reverse incentives."
Wage premiums fuel "reverse incentives"
Across domestic universities, not only is there a prevalent issue of low personnel expenditure in budgeting, but there also exists a contradiction between the low wages of the majority of teachers and the high salaries offered to a few high-level talents from both domestic and overseas backgrounds, resulting in significant income disparities between high-level talents and ordinary teachers.
From 2019 to 2021, our research group surveyed 3,772 teachers from 302 ordinary undergraduate universities nationwide and found that the annual total wages of professors with senior titles were approximately 2.2 times and 2.7 times that of associate professors and lecturers, respectively. Teachers holding national and provincial academic "titles" had annual total wages about 2.6 times that of ordinary teachers.
Results from the wage gap-based Oaxaca-Blinder statistical model analysis indicate that one-third of the wage gap between "star" talents and ordinary young teachers stems from the symbolic effect of the "titles" themselves, rather than differences in ability and work performance.
This survey also discovered that the gross monthly salary and annual performance-based bonus of university teachers in the eastern region of China are 1.8 and 1.7 times that of their counterparts in the central region, respectively, while those in the central region are 1.8 and 2.1 times that of teachers in the western region. This not only undermines the stability of the university talent pool, resulting in a phenomenon where talents migrate to the eastern regions, but also hampers the long-term planning of "star" talents in research team construction and the production of major original achievements.
Current systems impede research collaboration among teachers
Presently, most domestic universities implement a post-performance-based wage system, where individual teachers' wage levels are determined by their positions. The "ladder-like promotion" mechanism limits teachers to plan their work for the next three to five years based on assessment conditions. Additionally, the research-oriented tendency in the tenure assessment, annual performance evaluation, and incentive systems of university teachers not only leads many teachers to prioritize research over teaching in terms of time and energy allocation but also fails to reflect the characteristics and contributions of ordinary teachers in multiple job responsibilities.
Moreover, many universities' research performance evaluations heavily favor the first author of papers and the principal investigator of projects, making it difficult to recognize the contributions of non-first authors and non-principal investigators through effective mechanisms. The recognition of achievements directly affects teachers' performance-based wages. It is evident that the current performance evaluation system prioritizes individual interests over team interests, exacerbating "vicious competition" among teachers and directly suppressing their enthusiasm and attitudes towards active participation in research collaboration. According to our research statistics, one-third of teachers believe that the current performance-based wage system at their institution is detrimental to research collaboration among teachers.
Furthermore, the allocation of scientific and technological resources between universities and research institutions increasingly relies on project competitions, leading to various research units monopolizing information, funding, and other resources through closed means. Within universities, the distribution of research performance between secondary departments also relies on the research output and project of each secondary unit. The competitive resource allocation model between institutions and departments is essentially caused by the current performance evaluation system, with various types of university rankings and evaluations of first-class disciplines emphasizing the achievements of the institutions, thereby hindering benign cooperation across units and disciplines.
However, many studies have found that global research collaboration not only increases the quantity of scientific research output but also improves its quality. Many innovative and groundbreaking achievements internationally are accomplished by cross-unit and cross-disciplinary teams.
Where does the reform path lie?
In the construction of university teaching teams in the new era, it is essential to advance the reform of university compensation systems and improve incentive mechanisms for income distribution. Faced with the unreasonable wage gap and performance evaluation system, improvements and explorations should be made in the following areas.
Firstly, academic labor market salaries should value ability and work performance, returning the honor and academic value of talent titles. Universities and relevant management departments should shift their focus from excessive attention to a few "star" talents to focusing on the compensation incentives for the vast majority of ordinary teachers, eliminate the disorderly phenomenon of setting "high prices" for "star" talents, and return the academic value and honor reward value of talent titles.
At the same time, universities should use limited financial resources to allocate salaries for talents at all levels comprehensively. Based on the establishment of performance evaluation schemes covering teaching and talent cultivation, research, and social services, ability and work performance, rather than symbolic titles, should be the core criteria for salary allocation in the academic labor market, and reasonable control of wage gaps among different levels of talents should be implemented.
For instance, the average annual total wages of "star" talents are often three times higher than those of ordinary young teachers. Excluding the wage differences caused by symbolic effects, the average annual total wages of "star" talents should be about twice that of ordinary young teachers. Therefore, when setting the salary treatment for recruited talents, universities can set the limit as twice the average salary of ordinary young teachers plus three times the standard deviation of their wages to ensure that the wage gap between "star" talents and ordinary young teachers is within a reasonable range. Furthermore, it is essential to combine economic incentives with non-economic incentives to enhance teachers' sense of actual gain and expected satisfaction. On one hand, it is crucial to fully respect knowledge and talent by establishing a wage growth mechanism that matches the level of economic development and the individual labor value of teachers, effectively ensuring that the vast majority of ordinary university teachers can lead a dignified life. On the other hand, improving the working environment for university teachers and establishing incentive mechanisms conducive to teamwork are necessary. Encouraging teachers to form research teams and collectively tackle projects that meet the country's major strategic needs will be beneficial. Considering the development needs and life challenges of young teachers, efforts should be made to enhance welfare programs in various aspects such as professional development, housing, commuting, and children's education.
Finally, innovating diverse evaluation methods and designing a classified performance evaluation system is crucial. The performance evaluation system should take into account the content and nature of teachers' work, reforming the performance evaluation system that previously emphasized research over teaching and talent development. For different types of positions such as teaching-focused, research-focused, and teaching-research balanced, performance assessment criteria should be designed accordingly to reflect the characteristics of different job tasks.
Moreover, it's essential to combine long-term incentives with short-term incentives, with a focus on long-term incentives to avoid the short-sighted and utilitarian tendencies of university teachers in pursuit of high performance. Some basic research work may not yield short-term results, and the research assessment period can be extended based on disciplinary characteristics.
When rewarding teams, a performance incentive mechanism can be established based on team achievements, rewarding significant research and teaching outcomes. Performance bonuses should be allocated according to team tasks and members' contributions, ensuring transparency and openness in the distribution of results. Emphasizing the procedural performance evaluation of teamwork, documenting individuals' contributions in cross-institutional and interdisciplinary teams, and considering them comprehensively in annual performance evaluations and achievement awards, can motivate team members to cooperate sincerely over the long term and produce more significant original research results.
(Authors: Professor from the Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, and Associate Professor from the Faculty of Education, Qingdao University.)
