In recent years, incidents related to the relationship between advisors and graduate students in domestic universities have been frequently reported. The most recent incident that caught public attention was the joint report by several graduate students at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications against their advisor. Behind these incidents, there is almost always a common focus of public concern, which is the trend of "bossification" of graduate advisors.
Public and industry experts and scholars have contributed many insights on this issue. Needless to say, almost all of these insights are in opposition. However, like many abnormal phenomena, the trend of advisor "bossification" is clearly opposed by the majority, yet it is paraded as a "normal phenomenon." This is perhaps the most thought-provoking issue.
The phenomenon of graduate advisors being referred to as "bosses" was discussed about 20 years ago. At that time, the opponents also constituted the vast majority, but there were also a few scholars who believed that "advisors are indeed bosses." The implication was that it had already become a "fact," so those opposing participants in the discussion need not "bury their heads in the sand" anymore.
Although in reality, public opposition may not necessarily prevent some advisors from willingly accepting the title of "boss," the question of whether this "fact" is reasonable or not remains. Without clarifying the underlying factors, one is bound to fall into the paradox of vulgarly understanding Hegel's notion that "what is real is rational."
When China resumed graduate admissions in the late 1970s, advisor selection was based on a "qualification system," meaning once an advisor obtained the qualification, it remained valid until retirement. At that time, university administrators needed to "invite" advisors to mentor graduate students. However, today, the system has shifted from a "lifetime system" to an "application system" for advisors, requiring annual reapplication. Failure to reapply automatically revokes the advisor title and enrollment qualification. In essence, advisors now need to seek approval from administrative personnel to recruit students. In recent years, the policy of not allowing the recruitment of graduate students without research projects (funding) has been implemented in most universities nationwide.
The advisor management model of obtaining graduate student enrollment qualifications through research projects (funding) is naturally an "imported product." The original intention of its introduction may have been to prevent some graduate advisors from being idle and indifferent. Setting aside whether this advisor management model is suitable, purely from a functional perspective, its side effects may not be smaller than its intended effects.
The importance of research projects (funding) for advisors in broad science and engineering disciplines is self-evident. In simple terms, the characteristic of this advisor management model is that the advisor provides research ideas, seeks projects and funding, and may even handle public relations, while the graduate students carry out the actual work. However, the issue lies in the fact that the research funding comes from the advisor, the living allowance specified by the school also comes from the advisor, and the encouragement of advisors to establish companies further complicates the situation. Faced with companies led by advisors, graduate students cannot remain detached. In this scenario, the advisor not only becomes a nominal "boss," but also provides additional fixed "service fees" apart from funding and allowances, making them a de facto "boss."
Since advisors have been "bossified," and with bosses having varying temperaments and levels of education, it is inevitable that they may demand graduate students to perform "tasks" beyond research. The advisor at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications is just an extreme example of such "demands."
While it is recognized that the "bossification" of advisors is undesirable and should be opposed, the current advisor management model is promoting this trend, creating the first paradox.
Currently, apart from "academic giants," those with administrative positions who shoulder dual responsibilities, and "elite" talents, most university teachers do not enjoy "boss treatment." This treatment requires individual application, once a year, and winning a project bid is like rolling the dice, with inherent uncertainty. To obtain enrollment qualifications, teachers inevitably divert most of their energy into project applications or seeking funding outside of research. This is why the media's opposition to advisor "bossification" resonates with the majority of teachers and garners support. It also amplifies another paradox: the more vehement the media's opposition, the more indifferent the management becomes.
In the media's opposition to advisor "bossification," "equality" is a key term. Their core demand is to maintain equality between teachers and students and criticize the inequality caused by advisor "bossification."
It must be acknowledged that this demand is morally just. However, conceptually, equality refers to equality of personality. In the current context, where advisors establish companies and personally subsidize students, a de facto employment relationship has been established between the two parties, transforming graduate students from a singular identity to a dual identity of "student" and "employee." Since they are employees of the advisor's company, they should fulfill their duties as employees, which falls under "professional ethics." Therefore, any abstract calls for "equality" between teachers and students are inevitably futile.
From this perspective, it is evident that the reasons why the above two paradoxes have not been effectively addressed lie in the clear misalignment between abstract moral criticism and the actual direction of advisor management.
In medicine, the premise of "targeted therapy" is to identify the "target." This principle also applies to examining the "bossification" of advisors and the various abnormal phenomena that stem from it. The so-called "target" lies in the increasing solidification of the advisor management model. Measures like "project (funding) supremacy" not only marginalize most teachers in academia, leading to a loss of academic drive, but also further alienate profit-making teachers in their role-playing.
At a deeper level, this advisor management model is also a product of the "generalization" of the concept of "education." Advocates of "generalized education" believe that beyond university classrooms, entities such as companies, enterprises, and even any social institution serve an "educational" function, making advisor "bossification" seemingly in line with the original intent of "education." However, such ideas are evidently a manifestation of self-loss after universities excessively socialize.
(Professor at the School of Political Science and Public Administration, Soochow University)
